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Abstract—JXME is the JXTA protocols implementation for
mobile devices using J2ME. Two different flavors of JXME
have been implemented, each one specific for a particular set
of devices, according to their capabilities. The main value of
JXME is its simplicity to create peer-to-peer (P2P) applications in
limited devices. In addition to assessing JXME functionalities, it is
also important to realize the default security level provided. This
paper presents a brief analysis of the current state of security in
JXME, focusing on the JXME-Proxied version, identifies existing
vulnerabilities and proposes further improvements in this field.1
Keywords: peer-to-peer, security,Peer Group, JXTA, dis-
tributed systems, Java, JXME, J2ME.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks allow peers to provide and
consume services in a collaborative way. Examples of this
services are content sharing, processing and messaging. In this
kind of network, it is assumed that all peers have equivalent
capabilities [1], as well as a high degree of decentralization and
autonomy. Such environments have become highly popular in
recent times due to its great potential to scale and the lack of
a central point of failure. Just like many kinds of applications
have evolved from the desktop to mobile environments, it
was natural that P2P systems would follow the same steps
[2], as both architectures are based on node autonomy and
decentralization.
JXTA [3] is a set of open protocols specifications that
enables the creation and deployment of P2P networks. Using
the JXTA protocols, peers can communicate, publish resources
and find and consume remote resources, independently of
the actual transport layer and the implementation language.
Currently, most efforts to provide a JXTA reference implemen-
tation have been made on a fully based desktop environment
[4], [5]. However, JXTA has also shifted to the mobile environ-
ment in the form of the JXTA Micro Edition (JXME) project
[6], which allows mobile devices to participate in a JXTA
network. JXME heavily takes into account the idiosyncrasies
of mobile devices such as power and storage limitations, and
for that reason research has focused on these features [7].
However, security is a very important feature that often has
been forgotten in JXME research.
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The main goal of this paper is to analyze JXME security
in order to determine the basic security baseline that this
platform provides to current P2P applications. The security
analysis performed in this paper follows the idea of [8] where
a generic JXTA security survey has been presented. Applying
the same methodology, security is not analyzed by reviewing
basic peer operations in an isolated manner, but taking into
account the whole peer life cycle. With this approach, it is
possible to identify the available security mechanisms and
how they operate, which may prove useful for application
developers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an
overview of the JXME project in order to understand its main
characteristics and differences regarding JXTA. Section III
presents the security analysis of the most tested JXME version,
JXME-Proxied. This analysis includes related research about
JXME security and an overview of the standard peer operation
cycle. Section IV provides a brief comparison between both
versions of JXME. Finally, Section V outlines the conclusions
and further work.
II. OVERVIEW OF JXME
JXME is very similar to the desktop version of JXTA,
since they share the same basic specification. In both JXTA
and JXME, the basic organizational foundation is the Peer
Group, a set of peers with common interests which agree on
common services. Peer Groups offer a private context to pub-
lish and access different services. Peers exchange data using
pipes, which provide an asynchronous unidirectional commu-
nication channel. All resources (Peers, Peer Groups, Pipes,
etc.) are described using Advertisements, metadata documents
exchanged between peers using JXTA protocols. A network
resource cannot be accessed without previously recovering its
associated Advertisement. A detailed explanation of JXTA’s
generic protocols and services can be found in [9], [10].
JXME can be viewed as a JXTA compatible platform on
resource constrained devices which uses the framework speci-
fications for Java ME Connected Device Configuration (CDC)
and Connected Limited Device Configuration (CLDC). CDC
uses the C-Virtual Machine (CVM), an optimized version of
the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) adapter for mobile devices, it
contains some of the standard Java packages and it is addressed
to powerful PDA’s and smart phones. On the other hand,
CLDC uses the Kilobyte Virtual Machine (KVM) [11], has
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few of the standard Java packages and it is addressed to small
devices with very slow processors and very reduced memory.
CLDC has two profiles which define its operation mode:
Mobile Information Device Profile (MIDP) and DOcomo JAva
(DOJA). The former is a specification for the usage of Java
on embedded devices and the latter is a Java environment
specification for DoCoMo’s i-mode mobile phone.
Two distinct versions of JXME have been developed in
order to accommodate to a broad set of scenarios, like for
instance assuming that the system should provide different
methods of peer participation in the JXTA network or having
in mind the reduced device capabilities of the peers. On one
hand, the JXME-Proxied version is a simple implementation
for very limited devices, which delegates all work to an
external super-peer. On the other hand, the JXME-Proxyless
version is a more complex one, with CDC devices in mind,
where mobile peers may directly interact the JXTA network.
In this paper we focus in the JXME-Proxied version since it
is the most tested and used of both. However, we will provide
some insights on JXME-Proxyless in Section IV.
A. JXME-Proxied operation
The JXME-Proxied version, or Proxy-based, is the simplest
and the oldest one. It has been implemented for both CDC
and CLDC devices, as well as for the MIDP and DOJA
profiles. Devices which use this version are named Proxied
Peers in the JXTA network and, since they are assumed
to have very limited resources, cannot directly communicate
with other peers within the JXTA network. All messages are
exchanged through a Relay Peer, a special kind of super-
peer which implements the Relay and Proxy JXTA services.
The communication between the Proxied and Relay Peer is
performed with a simplified protocol based on HTTP. By
default, a single Relay Peer can support up to 150 Proxied
Peers. Figure 1 shows the JXME network architecture inside
JXTA network.
The main responsibilities of the Relay Peer on regards to
its Proxied Peers are:
• Listen to and answer requests from the Proxied Peer.
• Translate messages received from the Proxied Peer to
XML and then sending them to the JXTA network.
• Save messages from the JXTA network for the Proxied
Peer.
• Summarize and translate XML messages from the JXTA
network into a simple format which the Proxied Peer is
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able to understand.
Figure 2 shows the components of the JXME-Proxied
version. The main module is PeerNetwork, that specifies the
operations a Proxied Peer can execute in the JXTA network.
These operations are Join a group, Search or Create resources
(such as Peer Groups or pipes), Listen to a pipe to receive
data, Send data to a specific pipe, Close a pipe and Poll the
Relay Peer for messages from the JXTA network that have the
Proxied Peer as the final receiver.
When an operation is executed, a Message, formed by a set
of Elements, is created. HttpMessenger provides a messaging
service used in the HTTP exchange with the Relay Peer.
To reduce the number of messages sent to the Relay Peer,
they are stored in a queue at the Proxied Peer and each
time a poll operation is performed, the first message in the
queue is actually sent to the Relay Peer. Figure 3 shows the
communication scheme between a Proxied Peer and its Relay
Peer.
Once the main features of JXME-Proxied version are de-
scribed, it is obvious that the need for Relay Peers is the
main design limitation of this approach. Notice that the Relay
Peer architecture, that could be ideally considered as an hybrid
P2P system, becomes a client-server model when we reduce
the scope to a local environment, with one Relay Peer and
many Proxied Peers. Furthermore, if a Proxied Peer wants
to simultaneously use more than one Relay Peer, it will be
assigned a different PeerId for each Relay Peer. As a result,
a single Proxied Peer will effectively be considered as several
different peers within the network.
B. Related work
Some research exists on JXTA features [12] and security [8],
but not many efforts have been made for JXME specifically.
For instance, in [7] an analysis about JXME functionality and
performance can be found. Another example is [13], were an
authentication group membership has been developed. This
authentication is provided by the Relay Peer, which uses an
external Sign and LDAP Server, breaking completely the P2P
model proposed by JXTA.
JXME has also been analyzed and used to build a broad
set of applications. For instance in [14] an analysis to build
a Video On Demand (VOD) application over JXME is per-
formed, presenting its main architectural design. The speci-
fication and implementation of a simple chat demo can also
be found in [15]. In [16] an analysis of requirements for P2P
file sharing systems using JXME is performed, concluding that
JXME-Proxied does not achieve the desired functionalities, but
they are achieved by JXME-Proxyless. Finally, an application
to chat and share music is developed using JXME in [17].
III. JXME-PROXIED SECURITY ASSESSMENT
Guaranteeing a minimum security level should be one of the
main goals in most of the current P2P applications even though
this level may differ depending on the particular needs of
each application. In this section, a security analysis of JXME-
Proxied is made in order to know the security level provided by
the platform itself. This analysis follows the methodology used
in [8], where a general peer life cycle is examined rather than
isolate peer actions. However, in this paper we have focused
on the communication between the Proxied and Relay Peer,
also taking into account the way that a Relay Peer stores and
manages his subscribed Proxied Peers. Security between the
Relay Peer and the JXTA network is not analyzed, since it
falls into general JXTA security, and it is out of the scope of
this paper.
A. JXME-Proxied standard peer operation cycle
The standard JXME-Proxied general operation cycle in-
cludes in the same steps as in JXTA: Platform startup, Peer
Group joining, Resource discovery and publication, Message
exchange and Disconnection. However, internally, some oper-
ations work in a different way due to the particular commu-
nication scheme between the Proxied and Relay Peer. A brief
description of each step follows:
1) Platform startup: This is the first action performed by a
JXTA Peer and consists in loading the required libraries.
In JXME, the Proxied Peer also has to connect to any
Relay Peer.
2) Peer Group joining: At this step, the peer joins a Peer
Group, so interaction with other Peer Group members
is possible. Peer Group joining is managed by the
Membership Service, one of JXTA’s core services, which
allows peers to claim identities within a Peer Group.
3) Resource discovery and publication: Encompasses the
distribution of Advertisements, XML documents which
describe a resource in a Peer Group and how to access
it. A resource cannot be accessed without previously
retrieve its Advertisement.
4) Message exchange: This is the most frequently action
performed by Proxied Peers. To exchange messages a
Proxied Peer has two operations: listen and send.
5) Disconnection: It is the last operation a peer performs
in order to exit the JXTA network and disconnect.
B. Most common attacks in P2P networks
A security evaluation must be performed once the most
common attacks have been identified. In [18], these attacks
are described and classified into two large groups: passive and
active. Each group can be further classified according to the
particular action performed by the attacker.
• Passive attacks: The attacker just monitors peer activity.
– Eavesdropping (Evs): Capture traffic searching sen-
sitive information, such as passwords.
– Traffic analysis (TAn): Capture traffic and analyze it
searching for patterns.
• Active attacks: The attacker performs actions on the
messages, such as the deletion of data.
– Spoofing (Spf): Impersonate another peer.
– Man-in-the-middle (MitM): Intercept the communi-
cations between two peers, relaying messages trans-
parently to them.
– Playback (Pb) or Replay (Rp): Intercept data from
one peer so it can be reused at a later time, simulating
a real exchange.
– Local data alteration (LDA): Modify local data to
corrupt the system behavior.
– Software Security Flaws (SSF): Vulnerabilities due
to bugs in the source code.
C. JXME-Proxied Security evaluation
Once the default peer operation cycle is established and the
possible attacks are identified, it is possible to proceed with the
security evaluation. Basically, JXME-Proxied’s main design
goal is to minimize the consumption of device resources.
Therefore, it is expected that Proxied Peers have a very limited
security capabilities. However, since Proxied Peers delegate
JXTA communications to the Relay Peer, it is also expected
that Relay Peers will manage a basic security model.
1) Platform startup: Before a Proxied Peer may join the
JXTA network, a new peer identifier (PeerId) must be gen-
erated. The standard protocol specifies that it is the Relay
Peer who generates the PeerId and sends it back to the
Proxied Peer. However, in the actual implementation, Proxied
Peers can generate their own PeerId and freely connect to
the Relay Peer with this new identity. Because of this initial
communication protocol, Proxied Peers are very vulnerable at
the startup because his PeerId is transmitted in clear text over
the Network, allowing an attacker to learn it (Eavesdropping).
The PeerId generation process is very important since the
Relay Peer is only able to identify Proxied Peers by their
PeerId. However, since no authentication exists between a
Proxied and Relay Peer, an attacker can act as an invisible
intermediate Relay Peer, redirecting HTTP messages (Man-
in-the-Middle). In this operation, reusing intercepted data
jxmg 0 01 05 proxy 06
jxel 2 0 07 request 0004 join
jxel 2 0 02 id xxxx peer group id
jxel 2 0 03 arg xxxx password
jxel 2 0 09 requestId 0001 1
jxel 1 0 26 DestAddr xxxx destination address
jxel 1 0 21 SrcAddr xxxx source address
TABLE I
JOIN MESSAGE
(Playback) has no sense, because each peer start the platform
only once.
There is an initial authentication mechanism, outside JXTA’s
core, described in [13]. This mechanism provides a unidirec-
tional authentication, only the Proxied Peer authenticates the
Relay Peer. However, this authentication is provided using a
central Sign Server and LDAP database, which break the P2P
model followed by JXTA.
Finally, no security model has been considered to identify
correct JXME binary releases to another one with malicious
code (local data alteration).
2) Peer Group joining: In the process to become a Peer
Group member, the main restriction is that a JXME Peer can
only join to Peer Groups which implements the None Mem-
bership Service, the default Membership Service in JXTA. It
is used in groups without authentication, where any peer can
claim any identity, designed for applications with no security
concerns. Since the information in transmitted messages is
sent, in clear text, an attacker can know the group any Proxied
Peer is trying to join (Eavesdropping) and identify important
peers by its traffic (Traffic analysis). Due to the Membership
Service used is the None Membership Service, an attacker can
impersonate any other peer inside a group by claiming his
peer’s identity within the Peer Group (Spoofing). However,
in the join operation, reusing a directly captured message
(Playback) is pointless because a Proxied Peer can only join
once to a Peer Group. Therefore, replay attacks are not a
concern.
Currently, there is an initial implementation of a Member-
ship Service based on passwords, the Passwd Membership
Service. However, as mentioned in the JXTA documentation,
it was designed only for testing, since passwords are still
transmitted in clear text across the network allowing Eaves-
dropping , Traffic analysis, Spoofing and Man-in-the-middle
(see Table I). Again, this allows an attacker to impersonate
any other peer or join his groups. Furthermore, since in JXME-
Proxied this password is used only in the join operation, this
approach is pointless, as far as any other operation in the Peer
Group is concerned.
Another implementation of a Peer Group Membership Ser-
vice which is external to the JXTA specification is devel-
oped in [13], where an authentication mechanism is designed
between the Proxied Peer and the Peer Group. This is a
bidirectional authentication. However, as mentioned before,
the authentication mechanism is based in a central Sign Server
and LDAP database, breaking the P2P model.
GET /unknown-unknown?0,-1,http://172.16.0.37:2481/
EndpointService:jxta-NetGroup/
uuid-DEADBEEFDEAFBABAFEEDBABE0...0F05/pid HTTP/1.1
Connection: close
Content-Length: 0
User-Agent: UNTRUSTED/1.0
Host: 172.16.0.37:2481
TABLE II
PEER IDENTIFIER REQUEST
3) Resource discovery and publication: Advertisements
are transmitted without encryption and can be easily inter-
cepted (Eavesdropping) by an attacker, which can recognize
important peers analyzing its traffic (Traffic analysis). An
attacker can also publish/discover false resources (Spoofing)
and modify/delete Advertisements (Man-in-the-middle) of any
Proxied Peer since no authentication is enforced. Furthermore,
an attacker can resend captured messages performing several
times the original operation (Replay) in order to produce
multiple resource discovery queries. This attack may saturate
the Proxied Peer since all the response messages to these
queries will be, finally, received and processed by the Proxied
Peer.
4) Message exchange: In JXTA, network messages are
exchanged using pipes, briefly introduced in Section II. One
important feature in JXTA are secure pipes, which allow peers
to send messages using a secure communication channel.
Unfortunately, JXME Peers are not be able to use pipes
between the Proxied Peers and the Relay Peers (although the
Relay Peer will manage the pipes to connect to the JXTA
services on behalf of the Proxied Peer). The communication
between a Proxied and Relay Peer is performed using HTTP.
An example of a HTTP message can be seen in Table II.
Due to this functionalities, different attacks can be per-
formed: Eavesdropping, Traffic analysis, Spoofing, Man-in-
the-middle and Replay. These attacks mainly allow an attacker
to send/receive and sniff messages, impersonating any peer.
Moreover, as it is described in the next section, an attacker
can close legitimate peer pipes at leisure, ending the message
exchange.
5) Disconnection: Before a peer may disconnect, all pipes
must be closed. However, the main limitation at this step is that
a Proxied Peer has no operation designed to the disconnection
purpose. It is the Relay Peer who has to decide when to
unsubscribe a Peer or a Peer Group. Proxied Peers can only
perform an operation to close a pipe by knowing its id.
Since a Proxied Peer has not an specific operation to
inform the Relay Peer about to its total disconnection, any
Proxied Peer continues being vulnerable even when it is
disconnected. Since the pipe disconnection operation follows
the same communication scheme as the previous operations,
it also inherits their vulnerabilities allowing the following
attacks: Eavesdropping, Traffic analysis, Spoofing, Man-in-the-
middle and Replay. These attacks mainly allow an attacker to
impersonate any peer, stealing his open pipes, opening new
pipes, preventing pipe disconnection, using all his previous
Operation/Threat Evs TAn Spf MitM Rp LDA SFF
Startup V(2) N/A V(4) - P(TGMS) V(2, 4) - P(TGMS) N/A V(1) P(OSS)
Join V(2) V(3) V(4) - P(pass) - P(TGMS) V(2, 4) - P(pass) - P(TGMS) N/A N/A P(OSS)
Publish/Discover V(2) V(3) V(4) V(2, 4) V(4) N/A P(OSS)
Messaging V(2) V(3) V(4) V(2, 4) V(4) N/A P(OSS)
Disconnect V(2) V(3) V(4) V(2, 4) N/A N/A P(OSS)
TABLE III
JXME-PROXIED PEER OPERATION CYCLE SECURITY SUMMARY
(N/A: NON-APPLICABLE. V(TYPE): VULNERABILITY EXISTS. P(MECHANISM): SECURITY MECHANISM USED)
joined groups, joining to new groups and publishing resources
on the legitimate peer behalf.
D. Evaluation summary
Since JXME-Proxied is Open Source Software (OSS), sup-
ported by a community of developers, and it is also very
simple and small built using four classes) it can be considered
safe from Software security flaws. Furthermore, since Proxied
Peers do not store data locally, they are not vulnerable at
execution time to Local data alteration. The analysis of pos-
sible attacks and the existing security mechanisms of JXME-
Proxied, classified by peer operations, provides a vulnerability
map summarized in Table III. Attacks are those described in
Section III-B.
The main vulnerabilities found can be classified as:
• V(1): Malicious executable code can easily be built and
cannot be automatically discovered when installed.
• V(2): No encryption mechanism exists.
• V(3): No data flow masquerading mechanism exists. It is
easy to identify important peers by its traffic.
• V(4): No real authentication is enforced.
The available security mechanisms are:
• P(pass): Passwd Membership Service.
• P(OSS): Open Source Project.
• P(TGMS): Trusted Group Membership Service [13].
IV. BRIEF COMPARISON BETWEEN JXME-PROXIED AND
JXME-PROXYLESS
Even though we have focused on the JXME-Proxied ver-
sion, in this section we highlight the main differences with the
JXME-Proxyless security model. Such differences are mainly
based on the fact that JXME-Proxyless is designed for more
powerful mobile devices, with CDC in mind. As a result, this
version follows the same peer architecture as JXTA, allowing
mobile devices to directly participate into the JXTA network
by themselves, without the need of an external super-peer.
Any peer using JXME-Proxyless is named a Proxyless Peer
and is able to discover other devices and services, publish
Advertisements about its own resources, establish direct con-
nections to any other peer, create/join private virtual domains
(Peer Groups) and directly exchange/access content offered by
other Peer Group members.
Nevertheless, Proxyless Peers have some limitations on
regards to the JXTA base architecture. First of all, even though
most JXTA services are implemented, some of they are not,
and even when a particular service exists, it must be taken into
account that it may not have full capabilities. An additional
constraint is the fact that a Proxyless Peer cannot act as a
super-peer in a JXTA network. As a result, since super-peers
help network management, a JXTA network formed only by
Proxyless Peers may have scalability issues.
An important difference between both JXME versions is
that a Proxyless Peer does not need a Relay Peer to participate
in the JXTA network. Therefore, during the platform startup
operation, a Proxyless Peer does not perform any network
activity, only loads the JXTA libraries and creates the default
network manager, thus being protected from external interfer-
ence at this level.
In JXME-Proxyless, unlike Proxied, the Membership Ser-
vice is defined as generic, leaving up to developers to im-
plement their own version, with the security level required
by their applications. However, JXME-Proxyless provides no
implementation at all, allowing any Proxyless Peer to create
and join any Peer Groups. As a result, no security really
exists for the join operation, and no authentication process
is enforced, allowing any peer to claim any identity within
the system.
As far as Advertisement publication is concerned, in con-
trast of JXME-Proxied, where they are encoded in plain text,
JXME-Proxyless has a light XML parser and can directly
manage XML-encoded Advertisements, just like in the desktop
version. But in terms of security, no security layer over
Advertisements is provided either. Therefore, they share the
same vulnerabilities.
Another important difference in JXME-Proxyless is that can
perform direct input and output TCP connections, using pipes,
in contrast with JXME-Proxied where only output HTTP con-
nections are allowed. It allows Proxyless Peers to participate
directly in the JXTA network, but paying the cost of higher
resource consumption, such as battery power, because they
have to forward messages, find routes, save Advertisements,
etc. In terms of message exchange, while Proxied Peers send
all data in simple text, Proxyless Peers can send it using a
secure way. JXME-Proxyless developers are currently working
in the implementation of a wire transport security layer that
may be applied to pipes. This security layer is based in
JXTA’s own definition of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
[19]. This implementation basically allows private, mutually
authenticated reliable communications, protected against both
passive and active attacks.
Finally, the Disconnection operation is different in JXME-
Proxyless. It does not require any communication using the
network and no security vulnerabilities exist, since pipes
cannot be hijacked.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
Since JXTA and JXME are OSS projects, their expansion
mainly depends in the developer community interests. JXME
has a relatively short live and until now the main efforts
have been focused on achieving functionality features. Un-
fortunately, the work done in JXME security is very poor,
justified by the developers in the assumed reduced capabilities
of mobile devices such as limited battery, and storage.
Taking into account the security analysis of a Proxied Peer
operation cycle, we can conclude that this JXME version does
not have an appropriate security baseline, because messages
are exchanged with the Relay Peer in clear text, and no
powerful authentication method is provided. This allows any
Proxied Peer to impersonate other Proxied Peer which is
using the same Relay Peer, using his open pipes to send
messages, open or close pipes and basically, perform any
defined operations. The JXME-Proxyless version does not look
much more advanced on that regard, but at least a confidential
and authenticated communication channel is provided, using
TLS.
Once the JXME-Proxied security level has been analyzed,
further research includes developing new security mechanisms
to achieve a minimum security baseline. Security has to
be provided using light cryptographic methods, taking into
account the limitations of mobile devices. The vulnerabilities
that can be addressed are JXME library and peers authenticity,
and data flow encryption and mask.
Moreover, further research can be done in the security
evaluation of the newest JXME version, JXME-Proxyless.
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